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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT WENT WRONG AT THE SAGO MINE?

At approximately 6:30 in the morning on January 2, 2006, an
underground explosion at the Sago Mine in Buckhannon, West Virginia,
trapped 13 miners.' International Coal Group (International Coal),2 the
owner of Sago Mine, did not contact federal and state safety officials until
an hour and a half later. On January 4, 2006, mine rescue teams finally
rescued the sole surviving miner, Randal L. McCloy Jr., and recovered the
bodies of 12 miners who bravely lost their lives.4 At that time, Ben
Hatfield, the president and CEO of International Coal, made a public
announcement that only one miner survived the explosion.5 The
announcement sparked outrage among the public and the miners' families
because International Coal previously led them to believe that all 13

1. Sago Mine Disasterand Overview of Mine Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies of the U.S. S. Comm. on
Appropriations,109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter HatfieldHearing](statement of Bennett
K. Hatfield, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of International Coal Group, Inc.).
2. International Coal purchased the mine from Anker Coal in November 2005. Triumph,
then Tragedy in West Virginia; OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Jan. 1, 2006, at 16(2) [hereinafter
Triumph]. The Wolf Run Mining Company was the mine operator at the time of the disaster.
Dennis B. Roddy, Families FromSago File 3 Suits, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETFE, Aug. 24, 2006,
at Al.
3. See HatfieldHearing,supra note 1.
4. The twelve miners who died in the Sago Mine Disaster were Tom Anderson, Alva M.
Bennett, James Bennett, Jerry Groves, George Hamner Jr., Terry Helms, Jesse Jones, Dave Lewis,
Martin Toler Jr., Fred Ware, Marshall Winans, and Jackie Weaver. Triumph, supranote 2, at 16(2).
Before he died, George Hamner Jr. left a note for his family, which read, "We don't hear any
attempts at drilling or rescue. The section is full of smoke and fumes, so we can't escape." Ken
Ward Jr., CongressionalForum on Mine Safety Note Says Smoke Blocked Escape, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 2006, at IA.
5. Brian Todd, Grief Anger as All but One Miner FoundDead, CNN.COM, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/04/mine.explosion.0314/index.html. The media was criticized
for incorrectly reporting that 12 men had survived the disaster prior to Hatfield's announcement.
Mark Memmott, Media Forcedto Explain InaccurateReports on Tragedy, USATODAY.COM, Jan.
4, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-04-mine-media-x.htm.
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miners had survived. From that point forward, the Sago Mine Accident
became known as the Sago Mine Disaster.6
7
The Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 (1977 Mine Act)
provides in relevant part: "[T]here is an urgent need to provide more
effective means and measures for improving the working conditions and
practices in the Nation's coal or other mines in order to prevent death and
serious physical harm.... ."8 Under the 1977 Mine Act, "the first priority
and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the health
and safety of its most precious resource-the miner." 9 In 1978, the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) first began administering the
provisions of the 1977 Mine Act, which authorized the transfer of the
MSHA from the Department of Interior to the Department of Labor.' °
Under the 1977 Mine Act, the MSHA is authorized to enforce compliance
in underground and surface mines to reduce injuries and fatal accidents."
Additionally, the inspection provisions of the 1977 Mine Act require
MSHA inspectors to obtain information regarding health and safety
conditions, causes of accidents, possible imminent dangers, and
compliance with mandatory health and safety standards. 2
On April 26, 2006, McCloy Jr., the lone survivor, wrote the families of
the Sago Mine victims a letter, which stated that he and another miner had
found a gas pocket with methane in the mine roof three weeks before the
disaster.'3 After reporting the gas leak to his superiors, McCloy Jr. noticed
that someone stopped the gas leak with a type of glue, which was normally
used to secure bolts. ' The MSHA must promulgate and enforce safety and
health standards under the 1977 Mine Act, and International Coal must

6. A mine accident becomes a "mine disaster" when there are five or more fatalities.
HistoricalData on Mine Disasters in the United States, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and
Health Admin., http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/mshafct8.htm (last visited June 1,2007)
[hereinafter HistoricalData on Mine Disasters].See also J. DAvrrT McATEER, THE SAGO MINE
DISASTER: A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO GOV. JOE MANCHIN III, July 2006, http://www.wju.
edu/sago/SagoMineDisasterReportJuly2006.pdf (discussing the facts and the cause of the Sago
Mine Disaster).
7. See generally Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-965 (2000).
8. 30 U.S.C. § 801(c).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 801(a).
10. Mine Safety and Health, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin.,
http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/mshafctl.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
11. MSHA's Mission, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin.,
http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/mission.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
12. Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000).
13. Text of Randal McCloy Jr.'s Letter to Familiesof Sago Disaster Victims, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (W. Va.), Apr. 28, 2006, at 13A [hereinafter MeCloy Letter].
14. Id.
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comply with such standards. 5 However, according to a report prepared by
the UMWA, International Coal proposed plans that created many of the
unsafe conditions at the Sago Mine.' 6
In his letter, McCloy Jr. also stated that the miners had to share
emergency air pack rescuers during the explosion because at least four of
the rescuers failed to function. 7 However, even if there were enough selfcontained self-rescuers (SCSRs) for each miner, the miners still would
have been in grave danger because the rescue crews took over eleven
hours to access the location of the miners." SCSRs only provide one hour
of oxygen.' 9
Joseph Main, a former health and safety representative for the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), 20 expressed his concern that the
MSHA would limit its investigation of the Sago Mine Disaster to the
source of the initial explosion rather than exploring the "broader questions
about mine safety.",21 This Note examines the broader questions of whether
the government and the MSHA have abdicated their duties to regulate the
Nation's mines by failing to strictly enforce the 1977 Mine Act. Part II
provides background information regarding the history of mine health and
safety legislation over the past century. Part III addresses the miners'
rights to have the UMWA represent them at Sago, a nonunion mine, and
the public's rights to review inspection notes under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Part IV discusses the utility of a cost-benefit

15. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 803, 811-815 (2000).
16. See generally UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO/CLC, REPORT ON THE
SAGO MINE DISASTER OF JANuARY 2, 2006, Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.umwa.org/Sagoreport.pdf.
For example, the MSHA and International Coal permitted the use of substandard seals in mines,
decided not to promote the development of improved two-way communications, and failed to
require experienced mine rescue teams. Id.; see also Press Release, Phil Smith, Sago Miners "Did
Not Have to Die," UMWA Says in Report on Sago Mine Tragedy (Mar. 15, 2007), availableat
http://www.umwa.org/pressreleases/mar07/031507.shtml.
17. See McCloy Letter, supranote 13.
18. Ellen Smith, MSHA andSago Mine FactsBasedon QuestionsAsked of Mine Safety and
Health News Editor Ellen Smith, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH NEWS, http://www.minesafety.com/
pages/sagominefacts.html (last visited June 1, 2007).
19. Emily Bazar, Union Sues Over Safety of Miners 'Air Packs, USA TODAY, June 9,2006,
at 3A.
20. The UMWA is a labor union that represents coal miners. See generally United Mine
Workers of America, http://www.umwa.org (last visited June 1,2007). The UMWA was founded
in 1890 when the Knights of Labor Trade Assembly No. 135 joined the National Progressive Union
of Miners and Mine Laborers. See A BriefHistory of the UMWA, http://www.umwa.org/history/
histl.shtml (last visited June 1, 2007).
21. Joby Warrick, Sago PutsSpotlight on Safety Strategy: US.MineAgency Issues Citations,
But PenaltiesAre Light, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2006, at A03.
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analysis of the MSHA's relationship with big business and whether such
a relationship hindered an economically efficient outcome in the mining
industry. Additionally, Part IV considers whether the MSHA had a moral
and legal obligation to close the Sago Mine prior to the fatal disaster due
to the observance of numerous statutory violations. Finally, Part V
considers whether the federal government is liable for the 12 miners'
deaths due to its failure to enforce compliance with health and safety
standards and its approval of inadequate mining plans, which deviated
from the requirements of the 1977 Mine Act. Part V also addresses how
the MSHA and International Coal neglected their reciprocal duties to obey
the law, which led to a down spiraling loss of social cohesion.
II. HISTORY OF MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION

Dead miners make the best lobbyistsfor mine safety laws.
22
-J. Davitt McAteer, Former MSHA Assistant Secretary
Although there have been numerous reported mining disasters since the
mid 1800s, the number of fatalities has steadily decreased due to improved
mine safety and health legislation over the past century.23 In 1865,
Congress proposed a bill to create a Federal Mining Bureau; 24 however,
Congress did not pass the first federal statute governing mine safety until
1891 " After the turn of the century, Congress passed the most significant
legislation to date due to 18 mining disasters in 1907, which led to the
highest number of fatalities in coal mining history.26
In response to the numerous fatalities, Congress established the Bureau
of Mines (the Bureau) in 1910 to conduct research and reduce accidents in
22. J. Davitt McAteer, Essay: The FederalMine Safety andHealth Act of 1977: Preserving
a Law That Works, 98 W. VA L. REv. 1105 (1996) (citing Legis. History of the Fed Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969: HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 94th
Cong. 353 (1 st Sess. 1975) (floor remarks of Senator Javits (quoting 1942 Russell Sage Foundation
study: "Dead miners have always been the most powerful influence in securing passage of mining
legislation."))).
23. See HistoricalData on Mine Disasters,supra note 6.
24. See HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977, S.

REP. No. 95-181, at 21-22 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3421-22.
25. History of Mine Safety and HealthLegis., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health
Admin., http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/mshainf2.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
26. See HistoricalData on Mine Disasters,supra note 6. In 1907, there were 362 fatalities
at the Monongah coal mine in West Virginia. Id.
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coal mines.27 However, Congress did not authorize the Bureau to conduct
mine inspections until Congress passed title I of the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act in 1941 (1941 Mine Act).28 Under the 1941 Mine
Act, federal inspectors had the right to enter and inspect mines with the
permission of the mine operator, but the inspectors were not authorized to
release their findings to the public. 29 Furthermore, inspectors did not have
the authority to establish or regulate compliance with safety or health
regulations.3"
In 1947, Congress authorized the first Federal Mine Safety Code,
which required inspectors who found violations to notify the mine operator
and the state mine agency. 31 However, Congress did not give inspectors the
authority to enforce the regulations.32 In 1951, a year after the death of 119
miners in an explosion in Illinois,33 Congress passed the Federal Coal
Mine Safety Act of 1952 (1952 Coal Mine Act), which gave the Bureau
the authority to issue citations and imminent danger withdrawal orders.34
Although the 1952 Coal Mine Act enabled the Bureau to assess civil
penalties for noncompliance with mining regulations for designated coal
mines, the 1952 Coal Mine Act did not authorize the Bureau to collect
monetary penalties for any acts of noncompliance.35 In 1966, Congress
passed Public Law 89-376, which extended the 1952 Coal Mine Act to
coal mines employing fourteen or fewer persons and which permitted
inspectors to give a reinspection closing order for repeated unwarranted
failures.36
Congress passed the most comprehensive legislation to date in 1969
with the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969

27. Act of May 16, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-179, 36 Stat. 369 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 30 U.S.C.).
28. Fed. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-49,55 Stat. 177 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-328, 61 Stat. 725.
32. Id.
33. See WILIAMS, supra note 24, at 23.
34. Prevention of Major Disasters in Mines, Pub. L. No. 82-552, 66 Stat. 692,694-95 (1952)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
35. See id. at 708.
36. Pub. L. No. 89-376, 80 Stat. 84 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
In 1966, Congress also passed the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, which was the
first federal statute that regulated non-coal mines. Fed. Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-577, 80 Stat. 772 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
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(1969 Coal Mine Act).37 Under the 1969 Coal Mine Act, Congress
increased inspectors' enforcement authority by authorizing inspectors to
inspect each underground coal mine four times a year.3" The 1969 Coal
Mine Act also gave miners the right to ask for a federal inspection,39
required mandatory fines for all violations,4 ° and permitted criminal
penalties for knowing and willful violations.4 The Bureau passed on its
enforcement responsibilities in 1973 when Congress created the Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration.
From the passage of the 1977 Mine Act until 2005, the number of
reported mining fatalities decreased significantly from 242 fatalities in
1977 to 57 fatalities in 2005. 43 However, by February 1, 2006, there were
already 19 miner fatalities in 7 different mines. 44 In response to the Sago
Mine Disaster, state lawmakers and Congress passed reactionary
legislation to enforce strict compliance with mine health and safety
standards.45 On January 23, 2006, West Virginia lawmakers, including
Governor Joe Manchin Il, unanimously passed legislation, which
requires: the miners to wear wireless tracking devices; the legislature to
establish a 24-hour emergency telephone number; and the mine operators
to provide an increased oxygen supply. 46 On February 1, 2006, Senator
Robert C. Byrd and Representative Nick J. Rahall introduced the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 2006 to address the need for increased fines
for habitual violators, quicker notification of accidents, and improved
emergency equipment.47
On March 9, 2006, the MSHA invoked an emergency temporary
standard, which it had only done two times since 1978, under section

37. Fed. Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
38. Id. at 749.
39. Id. at 750 (giving miners the right to request an inspection through a representative if
there are reasonable grounds to suspect a violation).
40. Id. at 756.
41. Id. at 757.
42. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 5.
43. Mine Safety and Health at a Glance, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health
Admin., http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/mshafctI0.htm (last visited June 1, 2007).
44. 2006FatalgramsandFatalInvestigationReports CoalMines, U.S. Dep'tofLabor, Mine
Safety and Health Admin., http://www.msha.gov/fatals/fabc2006.asp (last visited June 1, 2007).
45. See infra notes 46 & 50 and accompanying text.
46. West Virginia Passes Mine-Safety Bill, CABLE NEWS NETWORK: CNN.cOM, Jan. 23,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/JS/01/23/mines/index.html.
47. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Act of 2006, S. 2231, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); Fed.
Mine Safety and Health Act of 2006, H.R. 4695, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
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101(b) of the 1977 Mine Act. a" The emergency temporary standard
requires notification of accidents within 15 minutes, self contained selfrescuer storage and use, mine emergency evacuation, and the use of
lifelines, which are emergency escape ropes, in coal mines.4 9
Finally, on June 15, 2006, President Bush signed the MINER Act of
2006 (2006 MINER Act), which requires mine operators to provide miners
with additional oxygen and to notify the MSHA within 15 minutes after a
dangerous and potentially fatal accident.5 ° Furthermore, under the 2006
MINER Act, mine operators may receive a much higher penalty for
serious health and safety violations, 5 and the MSHA can seek court
52
injunctions to close mines if the mine operator fails to pay cited fines.
However, according to Representative George Miller (D-CA), the
legislation may not substantially protect miners because it fails to require
sufficient emergency oxygen in the mines and to expedite a deadline for
two-way communications.53

48. See Dirk Fillpot, News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, MSHA Pursues New Mine
EvacuationRules (Feb. 7,2006), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20060242.htm.
49. Emergency Mine Evacuation, 71 Fed. Reg. 12252, 12260-63 (Mar. 9,2006); see also 30
C.F.R. §§ 48.11, 50.10, 75.1714-4, 75.1504; 30 U.S.C. § 811 (2000).
50. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C.S. § 876(a)-(b) (2007); see also Press Release, Office of the Press
Secretary, President Bush Signs S.2803, the MINER Act of 2006 (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter
White House Press Release], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/
20060615-2.html.
51. See White House Press Release, supra note 50.
52. Dennis B. Roddy, Bush Signs Safety Law: Critics Say Legislation Doesn't Go Far
Enough in ProtectingMiners, PHrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 16, 2006, at A 1.
53. MINER Act Approved, MINING J., June 9, 2006, at 3. Following the passage of the 2006
MINER Act, the United Mine Workers of America sought an injunction to require "(1) immediate
and periodic random checks of SCSR units in coal mines... ; (2) immediate and recurring 'handson, in-mine emergency-like training' . . . ; and (3) inventory maintenance and reporting by
operators.... United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Dye, No. 06-1053, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59138, at *1-2 (D.D.C. 2006). However, the Court denied the UMWA's motion for a
preliminary injunction because the UMWA failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id. at *2. The Court also dismissed the UMWA's claims that the MSHA unreasonably
delayed taking action because the allegations were beyond the Court's jurisdiction. Id.

20071
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Ill. KNOCK, KNOCK: TIME FOR CERBERUS5 4 TO OPEN THE GATES

A. Looking for a Miner Representative: Tall, Smart, and Relentless
1. Introduction to Inspections
The 1977 Mine Act permits the MSHA to enter a mine with a
representative of a miner, without a warrant and without giving advance
notice, to investigate the cause of an explosion or to check for compliance
with health and safety standards.5 5 Moreover, the Secretary may seek an
injunction by immediatejudicial review if a mine operator refuses to allow
inspectors to investigate the premises.5 6 Thereafter, the public has the right
to inspect the MSHA's inspections records under the FOIA.5 7
MSHA inspectors are required to inspect underground coal mines a
minimum of four times a year and surface coal mines a minimum of two
times a year.58 Due to the significant concern with protecting miners from
injuries, warrantless mine inspections do not constitute unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment ofthe Constitution. Moreover, the
1977 Mine Act clearly explains what the mandatory health and safety
standards are and notifies mine operators of the frequency of inspections.6"

54. Cerberus was the three-headed, snake-tailed guard dog of Hades, the Greek underworld.
According to Greek Mythology, the dog refused to let the dead leave or the living enter the
underworld. VIRGIL, AENEID Book VI (1st century B.C.). International Coal should be held
accountable for the 12 miners' deaths and for refusing to allow the UMWA to enter the mine in the
months following the explosion.
55. Mine Safety and Health, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000); see also Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry
Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589,590 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (holding that
the Secretary of Labor may make a warrantless inspection of a sand and gravel mine to determine
whether the mine operator complied with mandatory health and safety standards and with citations
and orders or if there were an imminently dangerous condition).
56. Marshall,602 F.2d at 594; see also Mine Safety and Health, 30 U.S.C. § 818 (2000).
57. See infra text accompanying note 83.
58. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000).
59. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1980) (noting that "[I]f inspection is to be
effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential."
(citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,316 (1972)). The Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides in relevant part: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... "U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813(a) (2000).
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2. The Miner's Right to Choose a Miner Representative
The 1977 Mine Act authorizes a representative of the mine operator
and a representative of the miners to accompany federal inspectors during
mine inspections.6 A representative of miners includes "Any person or
organization which represents two or more miners at a coal or other mine
for the purposes of the Act [the 1977 Mine Act]. 62 Miners' representatives
are permitted to accompany authorized investigators "during the physical
inspection of any coal or other mine ...for the purpose of aiding such
inspection and to participate in pre- or post-inspection conferences held at
the mine."63 Additionally, there are no restrictions on the miner concerning64
which person or organization the miner can choose as a representative.
Rather, miners "may appoint or designate different persons to represent
' A miner may give the MSHA written notice of the miner's chosen
them."65
representative at any point before or during a mine inspection.66
A representative of miners may include a non-employee representative
such as the UMWA. Regardless of the representative's employment status
with the mine, the representative can only enter the mine if he or she is
accompanied by an MSHA official.67 Miners often choose unions as their
representatives; however, this choice has caused past controversy when the
union representatives tried to gain access to a nonunion mine. In U.S.
Department of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining Co., the court considered
whether the 1977 Mine Act authorized non-employee union
representatives to inspect nonunion mines.68

61. Mine Safety and Health, 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (2000).
62. Rep. of Miners, Definitions, 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(b)(1) (2007). According to 30 C.F.R. §
40.2, a person or organization designated as a miners' representative must file information with the
MSHA District Manager as required by 30 C.F.R. § 40.3(a)(l)-(3). This filing requires contact
information such as the name, address, and telephone number of the representative of the miners
and the mine operator where the represented miners work as well as a copy of the document
demonstrating the miners' designation of their representative. Id.§ 40.2. Additionally, the miners'
representative must send this information to the mine operator. Id.§ 40.2(c). Moreover, the MSHA
must maintain all filed information and allow the public to inspect the information. Id § 40.2(a),

(c).
63. Mine Safety and Health, 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (2000).
64. Rep. of Miners, 30 C.F.R. § 40.3 (2007); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Wolf Run
Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2006).
65. Rep. of Miners, 30 C.F.R. § 40.2 (2007).
66. 53A AM. JuR. 2D Mines and Minerals § 274 (2006); Mine Safety and Health, 30 U.S.C.
§ 813(g) (2000).
67. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 281.
68. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 56 F.3d 1275,
1277 (10th Cir. 1995); Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 278.
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Although the 1977 Mine Act authorizes miners to choose union
representation, mine operators still attempt to prohibit unions from
entering their mines. However, courts usually grant union representatives
access to inspect mines due to those courts' interpretation that nonemployee representatives may accompany MSHA officials during
inspections. This is precisely what occurred after the Sago Mine Disaster
when International Coal overstepped its bounds by trying to prevent the
UMWA from entering the Sago Mine. International Coal's actions suggest
that the company had something to hide.
Although Sago was a nonunion mine, two Sago miners designated the
UMWA as their miners' representative to accompany the MSHA during
the mine investigation.6 9 International Coal banned the UMWA from
observing interviews regarding the Sago Mine Disaster after the miners
requested the UMWA to represent them.7 ° On January 25, 2006, MSHA's

69. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 278. However, ninety-two of the ninety-seven miners
at Sago Mine chose coworkers as their representatives instead of the union. Id. The UMWA filed
documents with the MSHA two weeks after the explosion demonstrating that two miners
designated the UMWA as their miners' representative under 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (2000). Id. at 279.
International Coal President Ben Hatfield said that the union was "trying to insert itself into the
investigation in a self-serving attempt to boost their organizing efforts." Doctor: Miner no Longer
in Coma; U.S. Seeks InjunctionAfter Company BarredUnionfrom Probe,CABLE NEWS NETWORK,
Jan. 25, 2006. Additionally, Hatfield claimed that ninety-three percent of the "active hourly work
force" of Sago Mine started a petition requesting that three fellow miners, not the union, represent
them. Id. Hatfield explained, "It is particularly disappointing that MSHA and the state would be
guided by political pressures rather than the express wishes of our Sago Mine hourly workers."
Press Release, International Coal Group, Inc., Statement by International Coal President Ben
Hatfield, International Coal Group Issues Statement on Union Involvement in Investigation (Jan.
25, 2006), available at http://www.intlcoal.com/pages/news/2006/20060125union.pdf. Hatfield
continued, "International Coal Group strongly objects to the transparent attempts by UMWA
leadership to use the Sago accident as an opportunity to advance their organizing efforts and rally
their political influence." Id. However, UMWA attorney Judy Rivlin responded that "They [the
miners] have been given the right by Congress to designate us. The company [International Coal]
has no right to interfere." Cindi Lash, Mine Owner Tries Again to Block UMW from Sago
Investigation, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 2006, at A5.
70. HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Health,Education,Labor& Pensions, 109th Cong. 11
(2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter Roberts Testimony 1] (statement of Cecil E. Roberts, President, United
Mine Workers of America). International Coal released a press release on Jan. 18, 2006 stating:
[T]hey [the UMWA] have no familiarity or knowledge of the Sago Mine that will
benefit the investigation in the fashion normally anticipated of a miner's
representative. The UMWA seeks to interfere with the investigation in order to
exploit the tragedy at the Sago Mine for their own purposes in an effort to revive
organizing efforts that have floundered for more than a decade.
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investigators went to the Sago Mine to search for violations.7 ' Although
Wolf Run Mining Company (Wolf Run), a subsidiary of International
Coal, the second owner of the Sago Mine, allowed several Sago miners
designated as the injured miners' representatives and MSHA officials to
enter the mine, it excluded UMWA officials.72
As a result, the MSHA postponed the investigation and filed an action
for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent
injunction until the UMWA personnel were permitted to enter the mine.73
International Coal claimed that federal law prohibited the UMWA from
representing the miners unless the UMWA verified that they were acting
solely on behalf of mine employees.74 However, the miners refused to
disclose their identities.75 The circuit court entered a formal order for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Wolf Run from refusing to permit the
UMWA's entrance into the mine with the MSHA personnel.76 On January

Press Release, International Coal Group, Inc., ICG Objects to UMWA Intervention in Sago
Accident Investigation (Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter ICG Press Release], available at
http://www.intlcoal.com/pages/news/2006/20060118umwa.pdf. See also Sec'y of Labor ex rel.
Wamsley v. Mutual Mining, 80 F.3d 110, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a mine operator
unlawfully laid off miners, who participated in a local union's safety committee, after they reported
mine safety violations and the union notified MSHA to conduct an inspection of the mine).
71. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 279.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. ICG Press Release, supra note 70.
75. WolfRun Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 286. Opposing the miners' argument, WolfRun argued
that if one of the miners who designated the UMWA as a representative decided to terminate
employment, then Wolf Run would not know whether or not it could prevent the UMWA from
participating in any future investigations. Id. Additionally, Wolf Run argued that it may have a
legitimate concern with the UMWA's access to any confidential business records. Id. at 288 (citing
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 220 (Scalia, J., concurring)). In response to the
miners' designation of the UMWA as their representative, UMWA President Cecil E. Roberts
stated:
This is a courageous act by these miners, and is frankly something that they likely
would not have done had they not been assured anonymity by MSHA and the
state. They fear for their jobs, because they know the unwritten but widely
practiced rule among non-union coal operators-if you talk to the union about
anything, you're fired.
Phil Smith, Press Release, Technology, Information, Knowledge Available That Could Have
Alleviated Sago Disaster, United Mine Workers of America President Roberts Says (Jan. 17,2006),
availableat http://www.umwa.org/pressreleases/jan06/011706.shtml.
76. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 280. The test for preliminary injunction takes into
consideration the "relative harms" to the plaintiff and the defendant, along with the public interest
because such an order is entered before the court decides the merits of the case. Id. Moreover, the
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26, 2006, UMWA gathered a team of safety experts to enter the Sago mine
with federal and state inspectors." Although International Coal intended
to prevent the UMWA from entering the mine, International Coal had the
right to walk alongside the UMWA representative during the entire
inspection to prevent any possible misrepresentations of the mine
conditions.7 8 Therefore, International Coal lacked a sufficiently convincing
reason to prevent the UMWA from representing the miners, especially
when International Coal's ongoing lack of compliance led to the twelve
miners' deaths.79
Shortly after the disaster, Ellen Smith, managing editor of the
newsletter Mine Safety and Health News, questioned whether the public
would be able to retrieve MSHA's inspection records under the FOIA. °
Over the last few years, MSHA has changed its policy by choosing not to
release its records to the public after various mining disasters.8 1
B. Access to Inspection Reports Under the Freedom of InformationAct
Due to noncompliance with safety and health standards and the lack of
enforcement of statutory violations, the controversy surrounding the Sago
Mine Disaster expanded to the public's right to access MSHA record
under the FOIA.82 The FOIA enables public access to records of
governmental agencies, such as the MSHA, unless the FOIA or another
statute specifically exempts the records from disclosure. Under section
813(d) of the 1977 Mine Act, the public is permitted to access any records

Secretary of Labor's "interpretation of her own regulations is generally entitled to substantial
deference unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Id. at 286 n.3. In May
2006, Wolf Run filed a motion to compel seeking an order to compel the government to identify
the miners who designated the UMWA to represent them. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining
Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 651, 651 (N.D. W. Va. 2006). However, the court stated that 30 C.F.R. § 40.3,
which lists the requirements for the document evidencing the miners' designation of a
representative, does not require the representative to identify the miners. Id. at 655.
77. Phil Smith, Press Release, UMWA Safety Experts Prepare to Enter Sago Mine After
Federal Court Ruling (Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://www.umwa.org/pressreleases/jan06/
012606.shtml.
78. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d at 281.
79. See id.
80. Ellen Smith, Will the Sago Mine Investigation Gain Public's Trust?, MINE SAFETY &
HEALTH NEWS, Jan. 9, 2006, available at http://www.minesafety.com/pages/editorialjjan92006.
html.
81. See Smith, infra note 88; see also Tragedy: Where was MSHA?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Jan. 6, 2006, at P4A.
82. See infra note 92.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. V 2006).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

relating to the inspection of mine accidents.84 To comply with the FOIA,

the MSHA must disclose mine inspection reports as well as the inspection
notes to interested parties including the miners or their representatives.8 5
However, the MSHA initially refused to release such reports after the Sago
Mine Disaster. 6
Unless the MSHA had something to hide, there is no suitable reason
why it should have prevented public access to authorized documents.

Additionally, the MSHA's refusal to release the document suggests that
the MSHA not only violated its legal duty to provide information to the

public, but that the MSHA also violated its moral duty to make the public
aware of the safety violations that occurred at the Sago Mine. Whether the
MSHA hid the documents to protect International Coal has additional

moral implications.
Before President George W. Bush took office, the public had greater

access to MSHA records, including witness interviews and inspector
notes.8 7 Under the Clinton Administration, U.S. Attorney General Janet

Reno issued a press release and memorandum that announced the
beginning of increased government disclosure under a revised FOIA
policy.

8

However, the Bush Administration has since restricted the

public's access to government documents. For example, the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center may have influenced the
MSHA's refusal to release miner witness interviews and other documents
under the FOIA. s9 On October 12, 2001, U.S. Attorney General John

Ashcroft sent a memo to all federal departments and agencies encouraging

84. 30 U.S.C. § 813(d) (2000).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (2), (3) (Supp. V 2006).
86. Smith, supra note 80.
87. Id.
88. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Government Adopts New Standard for Openness (Oct.
4, 1993) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html;
see also Ellen Smith, Assault on Freedom of Information: The Public HasA Right to Know How
Decisions Are Made, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH NEWS, July 16, 2005, available at
http://www.minesafety.com/pages/editorialjulyl 604.html. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno stated,
"[I]n determining whether or not to defend a nondisclosure decision, we will apply a presumption
of disclosure." DOJ Press Release, supra.
89. See Smith, supranote 80. The first time that the MSHA refused to release miner witness
interviews occurred after the Jim Walters Resources Mine explosion on Sept. 24, 2001. Id. For
example, MSHA took eleven months to deliver previous mine inspection reports of a mine shaft
that exploded in January2003. Tragedy; Where was MSHA?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 6,2006,
at P4A. Additionally, at the Sago Mine, International Coal and West Virginia Governor Joe
Manchin briefed the press instead of the MSHA while the miners were entrapped, even though the
MSHA had public affairs officials at the mine. Ken Ward, Jr., Coal Mine Owner, Not MSHA,
Briefed Media, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan. 5, 2006, at P3A.
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the agencies, including the MSHA, to consider "institutional, commercial,
and personal privacy interests" before disclosing information under the
FOIA. 90 The Bush Administration's policy used privacy as a cloak to
protect business interests over the public's right to access information.9
Therefore, at the time of the Sago Mine Disaster, the public was not able
to obtain any business records which might have exposed statutory
violations such as those that occurred at the Sago Mine.
After the deaths of fourteen miners at the Sago and Alma Mines, the
U.S. Department of Labor repealed its policy regarding the distribution of
MSHA's inspection notes under the FOIA.92 On January 30, 2006, David
G. Dye, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the MSHA, wrote a letter to
lawmakers stating that inspector notes would be released when the MSHA
issued a citation or, if there were no citations, at the end of an inspection.93
The MSHA had to end its secretive ways for the sake of public policy
to avoid seeming insensitive to the loss of life. Additionally, if the MSHA
failed to repeal its policy, then its actions would contradict the supposed
intention of the newly enacted legislation that was passed in response to
the Sago Mine Disaster. The legal and moral implications of failing to
disclose the inspection notes until the citation or inspection termination
date indicate that the government and the MSHA may have already

90. See Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft, Memorandum from the Office of the Att'y Gen., to the
Heads of All Fed. Dep'ts & Agencies, Subject: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memo], availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/011012.htm. See also Smith,
supra note 88. U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft stated that, "This memorandum supersedes the
Department of Justice's FOIA Memorandum of October 4, 1993 ... " Ashcroft Memo, supra.
91. In the memorandum, U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft explained that the Department of
Justice and the Bush Administration were committed to "safeguarding our national security,
enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive business
information and, not least, preserving personal privacy." Ashcroft Memo, supranote 90.
92. Press Release, U.S. H. Educ. & the Workforce Comm., In Response to H. Republican
Request, Labor Department Makes Key Policy Change Impacting Mine Investigations, Rep. John
Boehner (R-OH), Chairman (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Labor Dep't Press Release], availableat
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/01/edwork013106.html. Although Labor Secretary Elaine Chao
previously received a letter on January 11, 2006 from Democratic Representative Henry A.
Waxman (D-CA) requesting the MSHA to disclose inspection notes, Chao did not respond until
receiving a letter from three House Republicans: Education and the Workforce Committee
Chairman John Boehner (R-OH), Representative Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), and Workforce
Protections Subcommittee Chairman Charlie Norwood (R-GA), on January 20, 2006. See Letter
from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, to the Hon. Elaine Chao, Sec'y of Labor (Jan. 11, 2006), available
at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20060111130229-34059.pdf.
93. Labor Dep't Press Release, supranote 92. David Dye stated, "I have recently concluded
that, given MSHA's unique statutory framework, inspector notes should generally be released once
a citation has been issued (or an inspection is closed without citations), rather than withholding the
notes until all litigation is concluded. The policy will be effective immediately." Id.
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abdicated their duty to protect miners. Due to the public's declining trust
in the government, many people began to question the government's
interest in protecting International Coal at the expense of the miners' lives.
C. The MSHA's Relationship with Big Business
When considering the MSHA's failure to consistently enforce the 1977
Mine Act with International Coal's attempts to prevent union access to the
mine, their behavior appears awfully suspicious. A look at the close
relationship between the two parties demonstrates that they may be acting
as cohorts to safeguard their best interests instead of acting in the best
interests of the miners and the public. Before considering the MSHA's
relationship with mine operators, it is important to note that the number of
coal mine fatalities has steadily decreased since the early 1900s due to the
passage of safety legislation.94 However, government officials,
representatives of the UMWA,95 and miners have recently questioned the
MSHA's administration of the 1977 Mine Act.
For example, the same day that rescue crews gained access to the 13
Sago miners, Representatives George Miller (D-CA) and Major Owens
(D-NY) called for immediate congressional hearings to determine what
happened at the Sago Mine.9 6 The congressmen questioned the $4.9
million cut to the MSHA budget from 2005 to 2006 as well as the
reduction in MSHA staff by 170 positions.97 Moreover, the representatives
encouraged a cost-benefit analysis of whether current fines actually
deterred mine operators who would otherwise "treat law-breaking as a cost
of doing business."9'

94. See HistoricalData on Mine Disasters,supranote 6.
95. The President of UMWA, Cecil E. Roberts, claimed that there is a "serious void in the
regulatory framework for underground miners confronting a mine emergency." See Roberts
Testimony I, supra note 70, at 6. Roberts stated that the MSHA has failed to promulgate certain
rules or has promulgated too few rules that deal with the protection of a miner's health and safety.
Id. at 2, 5-6. "We believe MSHA withdrew these and other proposed rulemaking efforts because
implementing them would have cost operators substantial capital-resources dedicated to miners'
health and safety, instead of production." Id. at 10.
96. Press Release, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, Lawmakers Call for Immediate
Congressional Hearings into Mine Safety to Help Prevent Another Tragedy, Congressman George
Miller, 7th District California (Jan. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Lawmakers Call], available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/edlabor dem/rel406.html. Furthermore, since President
Bush's inauguration in January 2001, Congress failed to hold any oversight hearings to analyze
workers' safety regulated by the MSHA. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. In a letter to Representative John Boehner (R-OH), Chairman of the House Education
and the Workforce Committee, Representatives Miller and Owens stated, "Oversight hearings
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Representatives Miller and Owens also sought review of the Bush
Administration's appointment of various industry executives to run the
MSHA. 99 In the past, President Bush attempted to appoint several industry
leaders, who may have had alternative motivations, as representatives of
the MSHA.'°
For example, in 2001, President Bush appointed a former coal industry
executive, David D. Lauriski, as the Assistant Secretary of the MSHA'O°
Although Lauriski worked closely with several unions and safety groups,
he also forged "alliances" with various organizations in the industry,
02
which troubled former MSHA representatives and the UMWA.'
President Bush appointed Richard E. Stickler as the assistant secretary of
labor for the MSHA on October 19, 2006, although the Senate previously
rejected Stickler's nomination twice.' °3 Stickler previously worked for a
mine and was the director of Pennsylvania's Bureau of Deep Mine Safety;
however, the accident rates at his mines equaled two times the national
average."° Although such alliances may promulgate safer mining
standards, the alliances may also lead to questionably close relationships
between the MSHA and mine owners and operators.'l 5 In response to these

should consider, among other things, whether the current fine schedule or application of that
schedule provides a sufficient deterrent to companies that would otherwise treat law-breaking as
a cost of doing business." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Lauriski resigned in November 2004; however, President Bush failed to nominate
Lauriski's successor until nearly a year later, and to date, the successor has not taken office. See
Lawmakers Call, supranote 96.
102. Ellen Smith, MSHA andSago Mine FactsBasedon QuestionsAsked ofMine Safety and
Health News Editor Ellen Smith, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH NEWS, available at http://www.
minesafety.com/pages/sagominefacts.html. In addition, John Caylor, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Labor for MSHA, worked in management positions at three different mining companies; John
Correll, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for MSHA, worked in management positions at two
different mining companies; Melinda Pon, Chief of Health for Coal, held a management position
at a mining company; and Mark Ellis, Special Assistant for MSHA, was an attorney to the
American Mining Congress. See Lawmakers Call, supra note 96.
103. InformationAbout the Assistant Secretary,U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety and Health
Admin., http://www.msha.gov/asinfo.htm (last visited June 1, 2007). Democrats and the UMWA
have criticized Stickler for choosing not to support protective safety reforms and for commenting
that safety laws at mines are "adequate," but not ignored by mine operators. Thomas Frank, Bush
Nominee Says Laws "Adequate "at Mines, USA TODAY, Feb. 1,2006, at 4a. See also Mine Safety;
Important Schedule, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,Oct. 3, 2006, at P4A. President Bush gave Stickler
(currently Assistant Secretary of the MSHA) a "recess appointment" in 1996.
104. Id.
105. See A Mining Disaster, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A16. UMWA International
President Cecil E. Roberts wrote a letter to President Bush asking him to withdraw his nomination
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relationships, UMWA President Cecil Roberts claimed
that, "For years,
10 6
MSHA."'
at
henhouse
the
inside
been
has
the fox
Previously, Davitt McAteer, the former Assistant Secretary of the
MSHA under the Clinton Administration, claimed that the principal
responsibility of the MSHA inspectors was to enforce the 1977 Mine
Act. °7 Yet, the Bush administration not only withdrew seventeen of the
regulations endorsed by Clinton,'0° but also abandoned many programs,
including union access to accident investigations and mine inspection
notes under the FOIA. °9 Additionally, the MSHA decreased fines for
safety violations over the last few years and failed to collect fines as
required by the 1977 Mine Act."0

of Stickler as Assistant Secretary of the MSHA. Phil Smith, Press Release, UMWA, United Mine
Workers Call for President Bush to Withdraw Nomination of Richard Stickler as Head of Mine
Safety and Health Administration (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.umwa.org/
pressreleases/jan06/012406b.shtml. Roberts stated, "[W]e now have a situation where the very
people who are supposed be in charge of enforcing mine safety laws used to be sitting in coal
company offices figuring out how to skate around safety regulations to increase production and
profits." Id.
106. Hearings before the S. AppropriationsComm. 's Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human
Servs., Educ., & RelatedAgencies, 109th Cong. 8 (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter Roberts Testimony
I] (statement by Cecil E. Roberts, President, United Mine Workers of America).
107. See Smith, supra note 102.
108. See Warrick, supra note 21. In September 2002, the MSHA withdrew the proposed rule
on Occupational Exposure to Coal Mine Dust, which would have protected miners from contracting
black lung disease. See Roberts Testimony II, supra note 106, at 9. However, four years later, in
September 2006, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report, which
stated that increasing numbers of coal miners from small, nonunion mines in Southwest Virginia
are suffering from advanced cases of black lung disease. Jen McCaffery, Black Lung on Rise in Va.
Miners, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at BI. The MSHA also withdrew its proposed rule on
Accident Investigation Hearing Procedures in August 2001 even though the MSHA lacks formal
rules for the purpose of conducting investigations. See Roberts Testimony II, supranote 106, at 11.
If the MSHA had passed the rule, there may have been less controversial discourse surrounding the
UMWA's attempts to investigate the Sago Mine as a representative of the miners. Id. As a result
of the Sago Mine Disaster, the MSHA began to reconsider some of the initiatives regarding safety
equipment, mine rescue operations, and communications technology. Bush Puts Mine Safety Back
on Agenda, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2006-01-21 -bush-mine-safetyx.htm.
109. See Warrick, supranote 21; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 2006).
110. Ian Urbina & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. is ReducingSafety Penaltiesfor Mine Flaws,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al. The MSHA has the authority to assess civil penalties up to $60,000 for
violations of the 1977 Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(2) (2000); HearingBefore the U.S. S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 5 (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter Dye Statement]
(statement of David G. Dye, Acting Asst. Sec'y of Labor for Mine Safety and Health). See Bob
Withers, MSHA OutlinesDebt Collection Practices,HUNTING HERALD-DISPATCH (W. Va.), Feb.
5,2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-05-mine-fine-collection-x.htm (explaining
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Under the 1977 Mine Act,"' the MSHA assesses penalties based on six
different factors including the mine operation's size, the history of
violations, the mine operator's negligence, the severity of the violation, the
mine operator's good faith attempt to correct the violation, and the mine
operator's ability to continue running the mine operation. 1 2 The MSHA
cited International Coal 276 times in 2004 and 2005 for various health and
safety violations." 3 Of these violations, 120 were labeled "significant and
substantial," which could cause injury or death, 14 and 16 were considered
"unwarrantable failures," which suggests that they were dangerous safety
violations or that MSHA previously warned International Coal of the
infractions.1 5 Although the MSHA claimed that the number of fines before
the disaster demonstrated "proof of aggressive enforcement," all of the
fines were for minimal amounts between $60 and $460.116 Moreover, the
MSHA issued International Coal 18 withdrawal orders to temporarily
suspend mining; however, the orders were quickly terminated after
International Coal remedied the violations. '7 Regardless of the number of
the MSHA's options for collecting fines and accrued interest when a coal operator fails to pay a
civil penalty).
111. See 30 U.S.C. § 814 (2000).
112. See Dye Statement, supra note 110, at 5.
113. Brian Bowling, Safety Violations Rose UnderNew Ownership, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
Jan. 3, 2006. The MSHA issued 208 of those violations in 2005 alone. Id. On April 7, 2006, Wolf
Run Mining Company, a subsidiary of International Coal, received an additional 115 citations
under 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (2000). Press Release, International Coal Group, Inc., ICG Corrects
Electrical Citations During Sago Mine Shutdown (Apr. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.intlcoal.cornpages/news/2006/20060407electrical.pdf. Still, International Coal
President and CEO Ben Hatfield said "Safety remains our top priority, as evidenced by our prompt
attention to MSHA's concerns." Id.
114. Alan Levin et al., Mine had Hundreds of Violations, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2006, http://
www.usatoday.con/news/nation/2006-01-04-mine-violationsx.htm?csp=34. Although MSHA
sought $33,600 in fines, International Coal and Anker Coal only paid $23,986. Id.
115. See Warrick, supra note 21. There are some inconsistencies in the actual amount of
violations because the Washington Post reported that there was a record of 273 violations in 2004
and 2005. Id. Under the 1977 Mine Act, an unwarrantable failure means "aggravated conduct
constituting more than ordinary negligence" by a mine operator. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1) (2000).
116. See Urbina & Lehren, supra note 110. According to Wes Addington, a lawyer in
Prestonsburg, Kentucky with the Appalachian Citizens Law Center, "Operators know that it's
cheaper to pay the fine than to fix the problem, but they also know the cheapest of all routes is to
not pay at all. It's pretty galling." Id. Considering that the International Coal Group reported a $110
million net profit last year, there is no reason why they did not pay the citations. See id Yet, to
show its active enforcement, the MSHA stated that in February 2006, it filed two lawsuits in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to seek injunctions due to the failure of two
mine operators to pay fines. See Dye Statement, supra note 110, at 6.
117. See Warrick, supra note 21. From 2000 to 2005, the number of mines reported to the
Justice Department for criminal prosecution decreased by more than thirty percent. Id.
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ongoing violations, the MSHA has allowed International Coal to continue
making a profit without concern for the safety of its employees.
In response to the public's criticism of the MSHA, David G. Dye, a
high-ranking MSHA official, stated that MSHA representatives increased
the issuance of withdrawal orders to shut down mines and increased
penalties for violating health and safety standards of the 1977 Mine Act." 8
Yet, Dye also stated that if a mine operator could exhibit financial
hardship, which would prevent the operator from continuing to run the
mine, then the MSHA would consider whether to reduce the fine." 9 The
MSHA also claimed that they have issued more citations during Bush's
tenure than those issued under the Clinton Administration. 12 Specifically,
the Bush Administration has issued 30% more major fines, which are
defined as a civil penalty over $ 10,000.121 The legislature should consider

placing criminal sanctions on mine operators who continue to violate
health and safety standards because the threat of a civil penalty has not
sufficiently deterred negligent behavior.
Dye also remarked that the 1977 Mine Act never permits the MSHA to
close a mine due to habitual or flagrant violations or recurring fines that
123
the mine operator fails to pay,122 unless there is a "mine-wide" hazard.
Yet, if the MSHA intended to protect the miners, then Congress could
have amended the 1977 Mine Act or passed new legislation to repeal this
policy. After a mining disaster occurs, it is much easier to claim that the
government had no authority to act than to pay the costs and spend the
time repealing legislation. Ifminers die because the mine should have been
closed, then the costs to the miners and their families are far greater than
the benefit to the government of its laissez-faire attitude regarding safety

118. Dye stated that the MSHA has even encouraged Congress to increase the maximum
penalty up to $220,000. Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Labor,Health & Human Servs., Educ.
& Related Agencies of the U.S. S. Comm. on Appropriations, 109th Cong. 2 (2d Sess. 2006)
(statement of David G. Dye, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health).
However, if the MSHA fails to collect the fines, then the total penalty imposed is irrelevant.
119. See Dye Statement, supranote 110, at 5.
120. MSHA Penalties: Down-or Up?, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
availableat http://www.msha.gov/sagomine/mshapenalties.pdf.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Questions and Answers on the Sago Mine Accident, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mine Safety
& Health Admin., availableat http://www.msha.gov/sagornine/sagoqaOI182006.asp. According
to the MSHA, MSHA inspectors documented 744 on-site inspection hours at Sago Mine during
2005, in comparison with 405 on-site inspection hours in 2004. Id. However, Bennett K. Hatfield
stated that the 1977 Mine Act did authorize the MSHA and its inspectors to close down a mine if
it was unsafe. See HatfieldHearing,supra note 1. Hatfield claimed that MSHA failed to shut down
the Sago Mine prior to the Sago Mine Disaster because it was not an unsafe mine. id.
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even if it leads to increased productivity. Due to the effect of economics
on the law, a cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to assess the
government's actions.

IV.COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PAYING CITATIONS VERSUS

PROTECTING MINER SAFETY

A. Applying Law and Economics to DetermineEconomic Efficiency
Although commonly used in corporate law, the study of law and
economics' 24 may also provide an insightful guide as to whether the
government and the MSHA have abdicated their duties to enforce the 1977
Mine Act. Judges incorporate economic analysis into their opinions
because law and economics provide judges with a "systematic mechanism
for predicting how rules will affect behavior."' 25 Therefore, it is beneficial
to apply tools of microeconomics, such as a cost-benefit analysis, to the
events surrounding the Sago Mine Disaster for the purpose of assessing the
costs of compliance with safety and health standards versus the benefits of
modifying such standards. By applying a cost-benefit analysis, it is
abundantly obvious that the MSHA's actions created an economically
inefficient income for all of the parties involved in the Sago Mine Disaster.
Law and economics utilizes both positive and normative techniques of
economic analysis.'26 In conducting a cost-benefit analysis, positive law
and economics considers how the law will affect a person's behavior,
while normative law and economics relies on the assumptions of wealth
maximization and rational choice.'27
Under positive law and economics, if the MSHA imposes a monetary
fine on a mine operator for a health and safety violation, then the fine
constitutes the mine operator's cost of noncompliance. If the MSHA
imposes a higher fine on the mine operator for subsequent violations, then
the mine operator will probably act in greater compliance with the law.' 28
124. In law and economics, scholars study the law by applying tools of microeconomic
analysis. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 (2002).
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 19-20.
128. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 20. "Just as people respond to higher prices by
consuming less of the good. . . , they should respond to enhanced legal sanctions by engaging in
less of the regulated activity." However, in the mining industry, increased legal sanctions will
probably force mine operators to engage in more regulated activity by actually complying with
health and safety standards.
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However, if the MSHA fails to enforce fines, then the mine operator will
probably continue to violate the 1977 Mine Act.
Under normative law and economics, wealth maximization encourages
society to increase social wealth. 2 9 Normative law and economics also
assumes that people are rational actors who make choices to maximize
personal benefits. 30 Although the MSHA promotes miner safety, its failure
to enforce the 1977 Mine Act enables mine operators to reap greater
profits at the expense of the miners who may agree with Bentham's
affirmation that government and mine operators act rationally, but only in
their best interests. 13 1 However, some lawyer-economists focus on the
distribution of wealth rather than the maximization of wealth.132 The
MSHA's actions suggest that it is concerned with wealth maximization
because it deliberately fails to collect fines. The MSHA may want to
encourage greater production in the
mining industry or to enable the mine
133
operators to reap greater profits.
In addition to a cost-benefit analysis, an underlying standard of
economic efficiency, such as Pareto Efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks
Efficiency, must also be applied when evaluating the legislative process.' 34
Before applying a standard economic efficiency, it is important to note that
interest groups, rather than the equal distribution of wealth, affect
government decisions.135 To determine whether a situation is economically
efficient, it is necessary to first determine "how to distribute social
entitlements."' 36 As discussed below, groups with special interests support
legislation that favors their goals, which may also negatively affect

129. Id. at 20.
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at20n.4.
132. Id. at 22. An individual maximization of wealth will not always maximize aggregate
social wealth.
133. According to the West Virginia Department of Commerce, Miners receive the highest
average weekly wage in Upshur County, West Virginia, earning an average of $768 a week; miners
earn an average of $18.75 to $20.50 an hour according to Phil Smith of the UMWA. Emily Bazar,
Despite Tragedy, Miners' Way ofLife Will Live On, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2006, at IA.
134. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION 34 (1991).
135. See BAINBRIDGE, supranote 124, at 23.
136. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 134, at 34. As Learned Hand stated, "We must ask
what a proposed measure will do in fact, how all the people whom it touches react and respond to
it? ...Then [ ...]one must make a choice between the values that will be affected, for there are
substantially always conflicts of group interest." Ernest Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, 28
HUMANIST, 20, 27 (1968) (citing LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172-73 (1960)). If one
group of people is entitled to receive a social benefit but does not receive that benefit, then there
is reduced economic efficiency.
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economic efficiency orjeopardize wealth maximization. However, special
interest legislation may be valuable when it advances moral principles.' 37
At the Sago Mine, the government effectively distributed to International
Coal the social entitlement to earn money at any expense and without any
redeeming moral significance.
In conducting a cost-benefit analysis, economists may consider whether
the circumstances lead to Pareto Efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency,
or they may apply the Coase Theorem to determine how to allocate
benefits through legislation or adjudication.'38 A Pareto superior
transaction occurs when one individual is made better off without making
another person worse off. 139 However, in most transactions including an
allocation of resources, it is difficult to make one person better off without
negatively affecting someone else.
For example, the MSHA's overly lenient policies prevented a Pareto
Efficient Outcome at the Sago Mine. The outcome was not Pareto superior
because International Coal was made better off. It did not have to pay the
fines while the miners were made worse off because the health and safety
violations led to injury and death. Unless the parties consent to a change
in the allocation of resources, then there is no Pareto Efficiency when
someone is made better off at the expense of another person. 4 ° Therefore,
it may be almost impossible to have a Pareto Efficient Outcome when the
government acts in alliance with big business.
The Kaldor-Hicks method' 4 ' is a wealth maximization analytical tool
that is also commonly used to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.'42 KaldorHicks Efficiency is administratively easier to apply than Pareto Efficiency
because an efficient outcome does not require that each party is made
better off, but only requires that the losing party can be fully

137. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 134, at 35.
138. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 19 n.2.
139. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common

Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487,488 (1979-80). For example, Person A would pay $10
for shoes while Person B would pay $20 for the same shoes. Person A would prefer to keep his
money than to buy the shoes for more than $10, but Person B would buy the shoes for any cost up
to $20. Both parties would be made better off by trading for the shoes in between $10 and $20.
Therefore, the Pareto efficient outcome is that Person B gets the shoes at a price between $10 and
$20.
140. See id. at 488-89.
141. Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes referred to as "Potential Pareto Superiority." Id. at
491. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the applicable standard for analyzing costs versus benefits. See
FARBER & FRiCKEY, supra note 134, at 34 n.91.

142. Posner, supra note 139, at 491.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

compensated.'43 If the losing party is actually compensated, then a Pareto
efficient outcome also results.'" There was no Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency at
the Sago Mine because International Coal could never sufficiently
compensate the miners or their families for the deaths caused by the
disaster. Generally speaking, miners' salaries are disproportionate to the
risk involved even if they are paid more than other jobs that do not require
a college degree.' 45
While the outcome at Sago Mine was clearly neither Pareto nor KaldorHicks efficient, to understand the true economic problem here it is
necessary to apply the Coase Theorem, which states that where parties can
freely bargain, the efficient outcome will result regardless of which side
the legal rule favors.'46 In the case of the miners and International Coal, the
miners would gladly have paid the company the amount it expected to
profit, rather than lose their lives. However, the key to the theorem is low
enough transaction costs to permit the parties to actually bargain freely. If
these costs are low enough the parties will establish a reciprocal
relationship through voluntary agreements in which they maximize
societal wealth, even though they are acting in their own self interest.147
However, transaction costs are almost inevitable and are often quite
large. 41 8 Here, the miners were not able to freely bargain due to substantial
transaction costs, including the Bush Administration's heavy influence on
the mining industry, the lack of bargaining power, the lack of information
on the miners' part, and the costs of organizing the miners' interests. There

143. See id.; see also John R. Hicks, The Foundationsof Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696
(1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositionsof Economics and InterpersonalComparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
144. Note that for an outcome to be Kaldor-Hicks Efficient, the losing party does not have to
be actually compensated. See Posner, supra note 139, at 491.
145. See id.
146. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960)
[hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]. For example, if a factory saves $1,000 by polluting, but causes
$2,000 in damage to a nearby neighborhood, allowing the factory to continue polluting would be
economically inefficient. According to the Coase Theorem, however, the inefficient outcome will
be avoided whether the injunction is granted or not: the neighborhood would gladly pay the factory
up to $2,000 to stop polluting even if the court sides with the factory. Likewise, if the damage to
the neighborhood is only $50, the factory would gladly pay up to $1,000 for the right to continue
operating if the injunction is granted. See Daniel A. Farber, ParodyLost/PragmatismRegained:
The IronicHistory of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 400 (1997).
147. See Farber, supra note 146, at 420.
148. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 146, at 15. "The world of zero transaction costs has
often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world
of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave." RICHARD
H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988).
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was no reciprocity. There was no agreement. The parties did not come
together to maximize their collective wealth.
In cases such as these, it is clear that the transaction costs are too high
for courts to rely on Coasian rules to sort out the efficient outcome.
Therefore, when circumstances like these dictate, a corollary to the Coase
Theorem provides a solution: the default rule should approximate Pareto
efficiency by considering what most rational parties would have wanted
in the absence of transaction costs. To promote fairness and efficiency, the
MSHA should enforce a mine operator's duties to correct violations and
pay fines because a rational miner would want to be safe. The MSHA
should also conduct an empirical study or take a statistical survey to
determine what the mine operators and miners would have bargained for
in the absence of transaction costs. Most importantly, the MSHA should
not have lost site of the intent of Congress to protect miners under the
provisions of the 1977 Mine Act.
B. The Unyielding Control of Special Interest Groups
Although the Sago Mine Disaster failed to achieve an economically
efficient outcome, scholars also recognize that moral values may dominate
economic analysis.149 Many statutes represent private rather than public
interests because, under interest group theory, politics consists of
coalitions of special interest groups who affect legislative decisions.15 °
"Rent-seeking," which is slightly different from interest group theory,
occurs when "legislation is not justified on a cost-benefit basis: it costs the
public more than it benefits the special interest. . . .,1 In other words,
decisions are made based on how it will profit one group (the "rentseeker"), and thus a cost-benefit analysis alone is insufficient to assess
government decisions because the analysis must take into consideration
how to distribute social and intangible entitlements.152
When rent-seeking is combined with interest group theory, the result
is public choice theory, which also derives from law and economics.
Public choice theory frequently considers how moral values affect the
legislative process.153 Under public choice theory, "well-defined,
politically influential interest groups use their influence with lawmakers

149. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 22. (citing RicHARDA. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 376-80 (1981)).
150. See FARBER& FRICKEY, Supra note 134, at 12.

151. Id. at34.
152. See id.
153. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 22.
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to obtain legal rules that benefit themselves at the expense of larger, more
'
diffuse groups."154
Coalitions of special interest groups of mine operators and miners have
affected legislative decisions over the last century. The Sago Mine
Disaster exposes the rent-seeking actions of special interest groups ofmine
operators who have succeeded in influencing mine legislation. For
example, mine operators have succeeded in keeping civil penalties for
violations relatively low. Additionally, if the MSHA is correct in its
interpretation of the 1977 Mine Act that it can never close down a mine
except under severe circumstances,' then the legislation costs society
more than it benefits mine operators due to the resulting miner deaths. It
is possible that International Coal and the MSHA mutually agreed to
protect each other from the public opposition by not publicly reporting
omissions, instead succumbing to the
each other's acts or intentional
"prisoners' dilemma."' 56 Moreover, the 1977 Mine Act required the
MSHA to ensure that mine rescue teams were available for rescue and
recovery in the event of an emergency. 5 7 However, rescue teams did not
enter the Sago Mine until more than eleven hours after the initial explosion
due to safety concerns for the teams, 5 ' but this time may have been
shortened if the rescue teams were permanently stationed on the site as
required.
Although rent-seeking is not favored, it maybe acceptable under public
choice theory when it promotes social values due to the limitation on the
economic efficiency standard.' The mine operators' influence on mine
legislation has led to many miner injuries and fatalities. However, for the
first time in many years, the reactionary legislation passed after the Sago
Mine Disaster represents a shift in the legislative control of special interest
groups from proponents of business to proponents of safety. Although the
legislation, such as the emergency temporary standards and the MINER
Act of 2006, is heavily rooted in promoting special interests, the
legislation is still beneficial because it advances the social values of

154. Id.at 22-23.
155. See supratext accompanying note 123.
156. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 134, at 36. In the prisoners' dilemma, two prisoners
each would be better off if they kept quiet but each has the incentive to "rat" the other out to receive
a lighter sentence. The result is that they both talk and are both worse off. Id.
157. 30 U.S.C. §§ 825(e)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), (iv)(I1)(dd) (2000). The mine rescue teams must
arrive "at the mine site(s) within a reasonable time after notification of an occurrence which might
require their services." 30 C.F.R. § 49.2(g) (2007).
158. See supranote 18.
159. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 134, at 35. "Calling a law 'rent-seeking' means at
most that it decreases society's total wealth, but this price may be worth paying." Id.
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protecting miners and enforcing compliance with the law. Additionally,
rent-seeking by the miners and by mine operators actually leads to an
efficient outcome because the market is comprised of groups of rentseekers interacting. Notwithstanding its good intent, the reactionary
legislation passed in response to the Sago Mine Disaster has yet to prove
that the miners will benefit from the quicker notification and improved
technological support.
C. JusticeHolmes's Notion ofLegal Duty
In his discussion of morality and the law, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes explained that the confusion between morality and law may lead
a person to incorrectly believe that a duty is separate from the
consequences of a breach of that duty leading to sanctions.16 ° Furthermore,
a legal duty is merely a "prediction" that the result of a person's acts or
failure to act will lead to a judgment against that person or the loss of a
legal right. 6 ' Justice Holmes commented that understanding the
differences between morality and the law requires "mastery of the law as
a business" because both a "bad man" and a good man want to escape any
meetings with the "public force., 162 A "bad" man always conducts a costbenefit analysis to determine what the courts will do and how he can
escape any penalties. 163 It does not matter to a "bad" man whether his
actions are lawful or unlawful as long as there are no additional
disadvantages attached to performing that action such as a compulsory
payment of money."6 In other words, there is a distinction between
morality and law: a "bad" man may be amoral (or even immoral), but he
does not want to pay fines or suffer other legal sanctions. 165 Holmes
explained that to deter the "bad" man from breaking the law, it is essential
to create sanctions that will outweigh any benefits.1 66 Additionally, by

160. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 459. This is Holmes's (in)famous amoral, theoretical man, whom he describes as
"a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of
it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." Id.Furthermore, Justice Holmes stated that "[T]he law,
if not a part of morality, is limited by it." Id. at 460.
163. Id. at 461.
164. Id.
165. See Holmes, supra note 160, at 459.
166. Robert C.L. Moffat, How Can Law Pave the Roadto PerpetualPeace? What Law Does
and What Law Does Well, in 3 KANT AND THE PROBLEMS OFTHE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 295-302

(Justyna Miklaszewska ed., 2006).
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punishing guilty criminals, "good"
citizens will become aware of the
67
importance of obeying the law. 1
Following Holmes's argument, the legislature should increase penalties
for mine safety and health violations, or at least require the MSHA to
enforce existing penalties, to provide incentives for the "bad" men to act
according to societal values. If such penalties are increased, then the "bad"
man will surely find that the cost of paying increased penalties does not
outweigh the benefit of shoddy repairs and negligent inspections. If
International Coal is the bad man who commits mine safety and health
violations, and the MSHA fails to attach any penalties for the failure to pay
fines, then International Coal will continue to commit violations without
any further disadvantages. Without incentives to comport with society's
moral values, International Coal will avoid its legal duty to improve mine
safety by performing a simple cost-benefit analysis, refusing to take the
miners' welfare into consideration.
In response to Justice Holmes, Lon L. Fuller explained that the "bad"
man must consider his own moral values by "look[ing] at the law through
168
the eyes of a good man" if he truly wants to protect his own interests.
Fuller stated that "it is a peculiar sort of bad man who is worried about
judicial decrees... but apparently not about the possible loss of friends
and customers. ' 69 Mirroring this sentiment, International Coal was
concerned with the UMWA's access into its mine, but failed to correct
violations that caused the deaths of the twelve miners, not to mention
irreparable damage to its public image that vastly outweighed its expected
profits.
D. Morality Lost
[J]ustas goodmorals, if they are to be maintained,have need of the laws,
so the laws, if they are 17to0 be observed, have need of good morals.
-Niccol6 Machiavelli

167. Id. Moffat discusses French sociologist Emile Durkheim's view that punishing the guilty
is necessary; however, even more important is the importance of sanctioning criminals to show
good citizens that "[they] are right to abide by the law. Id.
168.

LON L. FULLER, THE LAW INQUEST OF ITSELF 94-95 (1940).

169. Id. at 93.
170. NiccOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVius 241 (Allan

Gilbert trans., 1965).
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A person's actions are subject to social control if the consequences of
those actions affect another person or, more specifically, if the actions are
likely to harm another person.' 7 ' However, if the actions fall outside the
scope of the law, the actions remain part of that person's "private
morality," which should escape legal enforcement. 72
' Under Fuller's notion
of the internal morality of law, a lawmaker must seek to achieve "implicit
goals of legality," including the requirements of "promulgation, noncontradictoriness, possibility of performance, and congruence between the
rules as announced and the rules as enforced," to make law.' 73 "No matter
how laudable the substantive goals of the lawgiver might be, failure to
comply at least minimally with the procedures demanded by the principles
of legality will fail to produce law."' 7 4 The MSHA's failures to comply
with the procedures required under the 1977 Mine Act suggest that the
legislation did not adhere to the principles of legality.
A critical element of a lawmaker's morality role is implicit promisekeeping, which includes sets of reciprocal duties owed by one party to
another in "interrelated roles.' 75 Furthermore, under the "relational
contract theory," there is an implicit contract between lawgivers and
citizens, which includes a duty to make law and a reciprocal duty to abide
by the law. 176 Following the internal morality of the law, the lawgiver has
a moral duty to abide by this contract, or, in other words, to adhere to the
principles of legality, by keeping its implicit promises to make and enforce
law. 17 7 However, if the lawgiver breaches this contract, then the citizens
are no longer required to fulfill their duty to abide by the law. 78 In the
mining industry, miners and mine operators mutually rely on each other
to receive income. Miners have the expectation that the mine operators

171. See Nagel, supranote 136, at 268-69. John Stuart Mill stated that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others." Id. at 21 (citing J.S. MILL, UTILrrARANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (Everyman's Library ed., 1950).
172. See id. at 268-69
173. Robert Moffat, ImplicitPromise-KeepingandFuller'sInternalMoralityofLaw, BFT 11
RECHTSTHEORIE 215 (1991) (citing LON FULLER, THE MORALTY OF LAW 33-94 (Rev. ed. 1969)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 217. "The lawgiver necessarily has a duty to give law. The citizen has a reciprocal
duty to obey law." Id. at 219. If the lawgiver accepts the role to make law, then the lawgiver
implicitly promises to abide by the internal morality of law. Id. Furthermore, such implied promises
"create mutual obligations to make law and to comply with it." Id. at 219-20.
176. Id. at 220-21.
177. Moffat, supra note 173, at 221.
178. Id.
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will keep the mine in safe working conditions.'79 Miners also rely on the
MSHA to enforce the law, which it has failed to do. Therefore, the MSHA
has violated its moral duty to keep implicit promises, which has enabled
International Coal to breach its duty to abide by the law. Under the internal
morality of law, then, International Coal has forfeited its right to receive
the duties owed by the miners, who also have an interrelated role to
perform for the mine operator. 8 ° Because moral duty depends on
reciprocity, the miners will probably only exercise a moral duty if they
know that International Coal and the MSHA will reciprocate the same kind
of treatment. 8 '
There has been an atrophy of moral duty attributed to the breakdown
in reciprocal relationships, which has generally forced lawmakers to
increase penalties for violations of existing laws.'82 Although there was a
breakdown in such relationships at the Sago Mine, an increase in penalties
may have failed to improve reciprocity due to the MSHA's track record of
choosing not to implement various laws. Yet, "the more the basis in
reciprocity of genuine moral duty is eroded, the more state power is
exerted in a futile effort to fill the gap."' 83 The reactionary legislation
passed in response to the Sago Mine Disaster may be an example of such
a futile effort. For example, in a Senate Appropriations subcommittee
hearing held more than a year after the disaster, Stickler, the head of the
MSHA, recognized that the MSHA had failed to institute many of the
mining safety reforms enacted subsequent to the disaster.'84 In conducting
a cost-benefit analysis of a moral duty based on reciprocity, there are three
limitations on the government: citizens will only exercise their moral duty
if they expect a reciprocal relationship; citizens will only obey the law if
the government follows the principles of legality; and the government
must have sufficient resources to enforce the laws if the citizens do not

179. See id.
at 220 (stating that under the law of contracts, parties make and keep promises due
to their mutual reliance on the expectation that the other party will perform).
180. See id.
at 217.
181. Robert Moffat, Obligationto Obey the Law, 1 INT'LJ. APPLIED PHIL. 33,34 (1983). "[I]t
is extremely costly to attempt to impose legal duties in the absence of underlying moral duties
founded on reciprocity." Id.at 36.
182. Id. at 38. There is a substantive and a procedural obligation to obey the law, but the
difference lies in the content of the law versus the manner of making the law. Id. at 39.
183. Id. at 38-39.
184. Kimberly Hefling, Mining Official Fields Safety Concern, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28,
2007, availableathttp://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-02-28-707363219_x.htm. See
infra notes 103 & 104 and accompanying text (regarding Stickler's appointment to the head of
MSHA).

MINING FOR MORALITY AT SAGO MINE: BIG BUSINESS AND BIG MONEY

obey.185 If citizens do not comply with the laws, then the government must
allocate resources to enforce the law.'8 6 Because the MSHA failed to
enforce the violations, International Coal failed to exercise its moral duty
to protect the miners.
However, the MSHA has tried to allocate resources to enforce the laws
by creating the Alternative Case Resolution Initiative (ACRI), which
regulates formal hearings for citations and orders.'87 To handle the
numerous enforcement actions each year, the MSHA established the ACRI
to train experienced mine inspectors as Conference/Litigation
Representatives (CLRs) who represent the Secretary of Labor in formal
hearings, informal conferences, and prehearing settlements.' 88 Due to the
success of the ACRI, the CLRs have reduced the amount of formal
litigation. 89
' However, litigation may be necessary to prevent the violators
from evading their legal and moral duties to obey the law. Additionally,
the ACRI may not be the most economically efficient solution since it did
nothing to encourage International Coal's adherence to its implicit
promises.
To this date, the MSHA and International Coal have failed to take
responsibility for the Disaster. International Coal reopened the Sago Mine
on March 15, 2006 after claiming that lightning that was fueled by
methane caused the explosion, which led to the twelve miners' deaths. 9 '
International Coal claimed that the explosion was not related to any of the
cited violations at the Sago Mine before or after the accident.' 9 ' The
question becomes whether MSHA inspectors failed to cite International
Coal for violations that did relate to the explosion. Additionally, by
attributing the explosion to lightning, International Coal attempts to
absolve itself of all legal, moral, and economic liability. With the MSHA's

185. Id. at42.
186. Id.
187. Alternative Case Resolution Initiative (ACRI), U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety
and Health Administration, availableat http://www.msha.gov/mshainfo/factsheets/mshafct9.htm
(last visited June 1, 2007). The ACRI was created in 1994. Id.
188. Id. Although CLRs do not manage cases with civil penalty greater than $2,500, the
MSHA reported that the CLRs handle as much as 35% of the total disputed citations and orders.
Id.
189. Id.
190. Press Release, International Coal Group, Inc., International Coal Group to Resume
Operations at Sago Mine; Announces Initial Findings of Independent Accident Investigation (Mar.
14, 2006), availableat http://www.intlcoal.com/pages/news/2006/20060314sago.pdf (last visited
June 1,2007); But see Smith, supra note 16 (noting that the UMWA found that frictional activity,
not lightning, caused the explosion at the Sago Mine).
191. Id.
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lack of enforcement, International Coal has every reason to try such a
cowardly maneuver.
VI. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S LIABILITY

A. Sovereign Immunity Saves the Government.

..

Almost

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), enacted in 1946, constitutes a
limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity when government
employees are negligent "under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred."' 92 Under the FTCA,
unless the government consents, it cannot be sued.' 93 Moreover, the
government cannot be sued regarding how it exercises its discretionary
functions.' 94
To determine the government's liability for negligent acts of the
MSHA inspectors, it is necessary to analyze the government's duty of care
owed to the miners and the application of the discretionary function,
referred to as a "policy making decision."'95 Although mine inspections

192. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2005).
193. W. Eugene Basanta, FederalTort Liabilityfor Negligent Mine Safety Inspections, 85 W.
VA. L. REV. 519, 528 (1983).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Supp. IV 2005). Specifically, with regard to the discretionary
function, the FTCA does not apply to claims:
[Biased upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
Id.
195. See Basanta,supra note 193, at 532-33, 566. Basanta also included an application of the
misrepresentation exception in his analysis. Id. at 533. However, for the purposes of this Note, there
are inadequate sources suggesting any misrepresentations related to an inspection ofthe Sago Mine.
Therefore, the misrepresentation exception will not be considered here. The misrepresentation
exception is described in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. IV 2005) of the FTCA. Basanta stated "Of
course, other facets of traditional negligence analysis, such as the need to establish lack of
reasonable care and causation, as well as such limiting factors as contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk, may server to impede a plaintiffs claims against the government for its
inspection activities." Id. at 578-79.
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may be costly, the cost, "including the costs of liability for negligence in
carrying [the inspections] out, is arguably less than the economic, political
and social costs incurred when 'disaster strikes."" 9 6 A discretionary
exception "would appear to bar a claim ... for a failure to regulate a
certain activity, or to hire sufficient inspectors, as such decisions might
well fall within the scope of policy judgments."' 97 However, mine
inspections probably fall outside of the discretionary function exception
because they include an analysis of operational decisions, which are
subject to judicial review to determine reasonableness.' 98 Similarly, as a
matter of public policy, an MSHA's inspector's failure to issue citations
or collect fines should be subject to judicial review because their role is
vital for the protection of miners' safety. However, even if the MSHA's
actions are considered discretionary functions, the discretionary exception
should not bar claims against the government because the government
breached its duty to protect the health and safety of the miners, regardless
of International Coal's responsibility to prevent violations.' 99
Prior to the Sago Mine Disaster, in April 2005, Senator Jon Corzine
introduced the Wrongful Death Accountability Act, which would subject
employers to additional criminal penalties including possible felony
convictions for violations of a federal safety law leading to an employee's
death. 20 The Senator introduced the bill to amend the Occupational Safety
196. Id. at 558. For example, in late August and late September 2006, two more miners from
the Sago Mine lost their lives, but not while working at the mine. Vicki Smith, Two at Sago Mine
on Day of Blast Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006. The two deceased miners were not
accused of any wrongdoing in the disaster; however, they were responsible for examining safety
hazards at the Sago Mine prior to the explosion on January 2, 2006. Id. Furthermore, as of January
1,2006, the West Virginia legislature authorized a privately-owned company, BrickStreet Mutual
Insurance Co., to provide workers' compensation insurance for the first time in the state's history.
Shaheen Pasha, Mine Tragedy is New Insurer's First Test, CABLE NEWS NETWORK:
CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 6, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/05/news/sago_workers_
compensation. Before then, the state-owned companies provided coverage for workers'
compensation claims. Id. Unfortunately for BrickStreet, the company began business just a few
hours before the Sago Mine disaster, which made it the acting insurance company for International
Coal's pay outs to the families of the 12 deceased miners. Id.
197. See Basanta, supra note 193, at 566.
198. See id.
199. "[The miner] has become dependent on the government, with its expertise and authority,
to act reasonably for his protection in settings where his ability to protect himself is severely
restricted." Id. at 556. Although Jeremy Bentham, an influential advocate of utilitarianism, wanted
to necessitate a legal duty to act as a good Samaritan, courts have failed to find that a government
has a duty to act as a Good Samaritan in federal mine inspection cases. Id. at 550. This may be
attributed to the economic costs of such a duty. See Posner, supra note 139, at 506.
200. Workplace Wrongful Death Accountability Act, S. 947, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2005).
Other co-sponsors of the bill included Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
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and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)." 1 For example, under the Wrongful
Death Accountability Act, employers may receive ten years of
imprisonment instead of six months for neglecting safety rules, two years
instead of six months for notifying a party in advance of a safety
investigation, and one year instead of six months for making false
statements or representations to a safety investigator.20 2 The bill was
submitted for consideration to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, and to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, but the bill is still in committee." 3 If safety violations
continue to lead to fatalities, the Wrongful Death Accountability Act
should become applicable to MSHA actions as well. Under the Act,
International Coal would have been held liable for criminal penalties for
violations of the 1977 Mine Act due to the deaths of the Sago miners.
B. Dwindling Social Cohesion: Reciprocity andAnomie
Both the MSHA and International Coal have neglected their reciprocal
duties to obey the law. International Coal should be held liable for its
criminal actions, and the government should be held liable for encouraging
the MSHA and mine operators to continue their noncompliant ways. Lon
Fuller discussed the impact of reciprocity on criminal law in society.2° 4 He
explained that citizens promise to adhere to the laws by making reciprocal
exchanges of "cooperation and civility," which reinforce the importance
of complying with the law.20 5 Based on his analysis, if there is a
breakdown of reciprocal changes, then there should be a resultant
breakdown in cooperation and civility.
Indeed, there is a growing trend of anomie, the loss of social cohesion,
due to increased prosperity and decreased hardship as revealed by growing

and Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL). Sen. Corzine Callsfor Severe Punishment of Employers Who
Violate Safety Laws, U.S. FED NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005 [hereinafter Sen. Corzine].
201. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.). The OSHA Act created the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Labor, which has
strived to protect worker safety and health by preventing work-related injuries and deaths since
1971. OSHA Facts, U.S. Dep't of Labor, availableat http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/oshafacts.html
(last visited June 1, 2007).
202. S. 947, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); see also Sen. Corzine, supra note 200.
203. S. 947, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); see the Bill Status, available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd? bill=s 109-947 (last visited June 1, 2007).
204. See Moffat, supra note 166, at 3.
205. Id.
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incivility.2" 6 Anomie is "the loss of limits experienced by members 2of
07
society who lose a sense of the control imposed by social rules.
Therefore, if the MSHA fails to enforce citations for violations, which a
social group deems as immoral due to the increase in miner fatalities, then
there may be greater anomie that leads to an increase in violations and a
failure to pay fines.20 8
The decline of reciprocity, weakening social cohesion, and the
degeneration of personal responsibility are all indications of the loss of
social cohesion. 20 9 The decline in reciprocity includes a decrease in
positive reciprocity, including people who fail to recognize their societal
obligations, such as MSHA's and International Coal's duty to protect
miners, and an increase in negative reciprocity, including conflicts that
destroy social solidarity. 2'0 An example of weakening social cohesion is
the growth of interest groups which show intolerance to other viewpoints
by trying to destroy them,2 ' such as International Coal's attempt to block
the UMWA's participation in the Sago Mine investigation and the
MSHA's attempts to block union access to inspection notes under the
FOIA.Finally, the degeneration of personal responsibility is based on the
idea that victims evade responsibility by finding easy solutions, such as the
legislature's passage of reactionary legislation, which may never be
enforced.212
The government's breach of its legal and moral duty trickled down the
chain and influenced International Coal's failure to obey the law. The
government breached its legal and moral duty to protect the miners' safety
by forming alliances with mine executives. The MSHA breached its duty
by failing to enforce citations. International Coal breached its duty by
violating numerous health and safety standards to make greater profits.
This lack of social cohesion ultimately led to the death of twelve miners
in the Sago Mine Disaster. The miners were the only parties involved who
fulfilled their reciprocal duties to obey the law and perform their

206. Robert C.L. Moffat, Incivility Everywhere! 5 (unpublished article, on file with author).
207. Robert C.L. Moffat, Consent and the Criminal Law, BFr. N.F. 12 ARCHIV FOR
RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 147, 153 (1979).
208. See id.(hypothesizing about the decriminalization of offenses that leads to an increase
in deviant behavior).
209. See Moffat, supra note 206, at 7. The growth of excess negative liberty and the peril of
prosperity are additional indications to consider. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 8.
212. Id.at 11.
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contractual obligations. When all of this came to light, the miners' families
began to question why that was so.
VII. CONCLUSION: BIG BUSINESS AT SAGO MINE: NOT A CHARMING
PRINCE AFTER ALL

In The Prince,Machiavelli discussed how a prince must act to maintain
and protect his power no matter the cost.2 13 The prince must possess
certain qualities and use effective methods of governing without being
hated.214 The MSHA and mine operators follow this Machiavellian type of
rule at the expense of the miners' safety. However, the controversial
circumstances surrounding the Sago Mine Disaster have certainly
increased the public's distrust of big business in the mining industry.
For over a hundred years, the legislature has passed mine safety and
health laws following the deaths of numerous miners. Although the 1977
Mine Act purports to protect the safety and health of miners, the MSHA
fails to hide its ulterior motive to administer the 1977 Mine Act based on
the interests of big businesses, including the mine owners and operators.2" 5
In response, mine operators conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether or not they should pay to correct violations, pay a portion of the
fines, or do nothing. To achieve an economically efficient outcome,
regardless of the transaction costs involved, the government and MSHA
inspectors should not be immune from liability. Otherwise, the bad men

213. NICCOib MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 57 (George Bull trans., Penguin 2003) (1532).
214. Id. The Prince "exposes the reality of decisionmaking in ways fully applicable to the
political and corporate spheres." David Barnhizer, Essay: Wakingfrom Sustainability's"Impossible
Dream ": The DecisionmakingRealities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 595, 633 (2006). "Business and government decisionmakers are predictably Machiavellian
in their actual behavior, and so we must always consider the extent oftheir honesty, even when they
claim good intentions." Id. at 634.
215. "Sometimes the legislature is portrayed as the playground of special interests, sometimes
as a passive mirror of self-interested voters, sometimes as a slot machine whose outcomes are
entirely unpredictable." See FARBER& FRICKEY,supra note 134, at 2. However, Farber and Frickey
also discuss that, in addition to interest groups, constituent interest and ideology also affect
legislative action. Id. at 33. "[T]he most crucial step to prevent tragedies like Sago has less to do
with mining than with the norms of corporate behavior ....
Executives are expected to decide
whether to correct safety problems by weighing economic costs against benefits, not by considering
the human impact of their decisions." Jeff Milchen, The Lesson of Sago, TOMPAINE.COM, Jan. 6,
2006, http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/01/06/thelessonof sago.php. Milchen goes so far
as to say that "Though the timing was unpredictable, the Sago tragedy is not rightfully called an
accident" because the deaths could have been prevented ifthe corporate behavior was different. Id.
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and their cost-benefit analyses will dominate society's moral values;
even
216
if it means that human lives are just a cost of doing business.
International Coal stopped taking coal from the Sago Mine on March
19, 2007 as part of a "business decision" supposedly due to "weak coal
prices and unproductive mining. ' 17 Such action confirms that
International Coal was principally concerned with profits because it failed
to stop taking coal from the Sago Mine during the months prior to the Sago
Mine Disaster, although it knowingly violated many safety and health
standards. To protect miners' safety, the MSHA does not need to saddle
a white horse, but it should strictly enforce the 1977 Mine Act to reduce
the number of mining disasters.

216. HistoricalData on Mine Disasters,supra note 6.
217. Emily Bazar, Firm Stops Mining at Site of '06 Disasterin W. Va., USA TODAY, Mar. 22,
2007, at 3A.
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